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discussed in this document should be adopted by the
ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty societies
using as uniform a mechanism as possible.
2. The ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty
societies should develop a secure uniform database
containing full disclosure of relationships with commer-
cial interests for individuals (including planners and
reviewers of programs and publications) participating in
ACCF and AHA educational activities, products, pol-
icies, services, and scientific publications. The database
should be updated yearly.
3. The ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty
societies should educate their members and promote
compliance with: the AMA’s policy on “Gifts to Physi-
cians from Industry” (8); the ACCME’s “Standards for
Commercial Support” (10); and the ACGME’s “Princi-
ples to Guide the Relationship Between Graduate Medical
Education and Industry” (11).
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INTRODUCTION
“Professionalism is the basis of medicine’s contract with
society. It demands placing the interests of patients above
those of the physician, setting and maintaining standards of
competence and integrity, and providing expert advice to
society on matters of health . . . . Essential to this contract is
public trust in physicians, which depends on the integrity of
both individual physicians and the whole profession” (1).
Cardiovascular specialists support the fundamental princi-
ples of primacy of patient welfare, patient autonomy, and
the promotion of social justice.
For the purposes of this document, “self-referral” occurs
when a physician recommends a patient intervention from
which the physician may benefit personally. Such recom-
mendations usually facilitate the provision of efficient,
effective, and high-quality care, but may also afford the
potential for abuse. As former JACC Editor-in-Chief
William Parmley stated so clearly: “At issue is the question
of intent; if the intent is to provide excellent medical care,
the practice is laudable. If the intent is to subjugate medical
decision-making, then the practice is unethical” (2). Those
few physicians who are publicized for violating our trust do
not reflect the rank and file of cardiovascular specialists.
The cardiovascular specialist’s primary duty is to the
patient. His or her role is to promote patient welfare in an
increasingly complex health care environment, one that has
been made even more complex by the anti-kickback statutes
and Stark laws (see the following sections). Having entered
into a physician-patient relationship, physicians must coun-
sel their patients regardless of individual financial or medical
care delivery system considerations or other factors, such as
socio-economic status, race, gender, or sexual orientation
(3). The physician’s clinical judgment must not be influ-
enced by financial incentives from a fee-for-service system
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or disincentives from a capitated care system. Recommen-
dations should be made based only on medical merit (4,5).
Physicians must also contribute to the responsible steward-
ship of health care resources.
Growth and geographic variation in cardiac procedures.
The use of cardiac procedures in the U.S. is increasing over
time. Figure 1 displays changes in the number of diagnostic
cardiac procedures performed for Medicare patients be-
tween 1994 and 2002. Office-based procedures account for
much of the rise in nuclear and echocardiographic testing.
Many factors, such as the aging of the population, the
epidemic of diabetes and obesity, advances in technology,
and new therapies, may partially drive these increases.
Studies have demonstrated marked geographic variations in
the use of both invasive and non-invasive cardiac procedures
(6–10). The exact cause for geographic variation in proce-
dure use remains elusive. Similar studies have found a linear
relationship between the availability of cardiovascular diag-
nostic equipment in a given region and the use of such
equipment. The strongest predictor of catheterization in a
study of acute myocardial infarction was the availability of
onsite angiographic facilities (8). Other studies have con-
firmed this relationship across a variety of health care
practice settings. More recent studies have demonstrated
similar correlations between the availability and use of
nuclear equipment in a given area and the additional
correlation between rates of cardiac catheterization and
coronary revascularization (9). These data suggest that the
use of non-invasive diagnostic technologies appears to have
a multiplying effect on subsequent cardiac resource
utilization.
The important question raised by these studies of the
variation in cardiac procedure utilization is which rate is
“right.” Specifically, is higher use in a given region or among
those cared for by sub-specialists indicative of “over-use” of
procedures or is there “under-use” elsewhere? The available
literature on this topic is conflicting. Various studies have
examined the appropriateness of cardiac procedures in
various settings. In the majority of these studies, even in
high-use areas, more patients with accepted indications for
a procedure (ACC/AHA Guidelines, Class I Recommen-
dations) do not receive the procedure compared with those
patients who receive procedures without an accepted indi-
cation or with a contraindication (ACC/AHA Guidelines,
Class III Recommendations) (11). Studies examining the
impact of this variation in care on patient outcomes have
had conflicting results. Some studies show that patients
treated in regions with lower utilization of invasive proce-
dures have outcomes similar to those treated in regions
using more resource-intensive care strategies (6,12,13).
Other studies, however, have found that patients treated in
regions using more invasive procedures had fewer symptoms
and improved long-term survival (14). Outcomes in acute
myocardial infarction are better when the admitting physi-
cian is a cardiovascular specialist, reflecting higher usage of
appropriate medications and procedures (15).
ENSURING APPROPRIATE USE OF PROCEDURES
Various options exist for managing potential conflicts of
interest regarding self-referral in clinical practice. In-office/
in-lab procedures performed in accordance with ACC/
AHA guidelines by a physician who is competent in the
performance of the procedure simply reflects efficiency and
the appropriate standard of care. Physician ownership of
medical equipment, especially high-cost, high-revenue
Figure 1. Number of cardiovascular imaging procedures among Medicare patients, 1994 to 2002.
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equipment, is a complex professional issue. In all cases, the
ownership should be fully disclosed to the patient as
described in the American Medical Association (AMA)
Code of Medical Ethics (16). The core question is whether
clinical decisions are in the patient’s interest or influenced by
potential personal gain by the physician owner. Although
this potential conflict exists, these arrangements may im-
prove access and quality of care for patients. In general, the
following approaches should optimize care and reduce
concerns about inappropriate self-referral:
● use of evidence-based guidelines
● physician and laboratory credentialing
● periodic case conferences
● oversight/review processes
● consultation with other providers
● full discussion with the patient regarding risks, benefit,
alternatives, and the option for a second opinion
● disclosure/transparency of ownership
Utilization of ACC/AHA practice guidelines and clinical
competence statements. The cardiovascular community
has access to extensive and disease-specific treatment guide-
lines to inform diagnosis and treatment decisions. These
joint ACC/AHA documents include comprehensive guide-
lines for the management of most major cardiovascular
diseases, including acute coronary syndromes, stable coro-
nary artery disease, congestive heart failure, valvular heart
disease, atrial fibrillation, supraventricular arrhythmias, and
preoperative evaluation for noncardiac surgery. Additional
guidelines for specific therapeutic interventions are available
including percutaneous coronary intervention and coronary
artery bypass surgery. Utilization guidelines for most tech-
nical procedures have been developed by the ACCF, the
AHA, and other subspecialty societies. These include
guidelines for echocardiography, electrocardiography, am-
bulatory electrocardiographic monitoring, cardiac catheter-
ization, nuclear studies, pacer-defibrillator implantation,
and exercise testing.
Where appropriate, guideline-writing groups include
representatives from many specialties, including cardiovas-
cular surgery, internal medicine, family practice, emergency
medicine, and anesthesiology. These guidelines are easily
accessed, either in full text or in an executive summary form
on both the ACCF and the AHA web sites (www.acc.org
and www.americanheart.org) and can be downloaded to
handheld computers. The guidelines are reviewed at least
yearly and updated as needed. Thus, current evidence-based
information about best practices is now available to physi-
cian, payer, and patient alike, providing a powerful resource
for appropriate evidence-based care (17,18). These guide-
lines also provide recommendations for the frequency of
performance of office procedures and allow responsible
parties to play a key role in understanding the need for
testing. Specific recommendations for the performance of
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions are thus clearly
defined and are available to the entire health care commu-
nity; these broaden participation in determining when and
in whom to carry out patient interventions.
The ACC/AHA guidelines form the basis for three
additional instruments of great value in providing continu-
ous quality improvement. Systems-based approaches such as
the ACCF’s “Guidelines Applied in Practice” and the
AHA’s “Get With the Guidelines” programs have been
shown to enhance effective application and improve out-
comes (19). In addition, performance measurements are
being developed jointly by the ACCF and the AHA for
performance improvement and appropriateness of care.
Closely related are issues of physician training and compe-
tence in performing specific procedures. Practitioners per-
forming procedures on their own patients or by referral
should achieve certification of adequate training and main-
tenance of competence over time. The ACCF, the AHA,
the American Board of Internal Medicine, and subspecialty
groups have developed a series of documents that detail the
appropriate training and experience for competence in a
wide variety of cardiovascular procedures (20).
Laboratory oversight. Appropriate oversight by physician
laboratory directors is another approach to monitoring
self-referral while broadening responsibility and encourag-
ing proficiency in the performance of procedures. Regular
review by physician directors of catheterization, echocardi-
ography, nuclear, and other laboratories is important in
ascertaining that indications for patient referral, procedural
quality, and outcomes all are satisfactory. Additionally, they
ensure that caseload or other factors do not drive clinically
inappropriate laboratory utilization.
Participation in laboratory databases is essential, with
regular review and comparison to databases such as the
ACC National Cardiovascular Data Registry™ (21), which
can be used for benchmarking of individuals, groups, or
hospitals. While it is often difficult to determine the
appropriateness of any single procedure in any single pa-
tient, patterns of “diagnostic yield” from these tests can be
helpful. For example, a laboratory whose rate of finding
non-occlusive coronary disease that is significantly higher
than one’s peers may need to review its selection criteria and
threshold for testing. Professional review groups consisting
of experts from outside of the geographic region also can be
employed when local review is impractical. Diagnostic
laboratories should participate in accreditation and creden-
tialing.
Broadening health care responsibility. Given that the
potential for real or unconscious bias can be driven by
financial conflicts, another approach to avoiding such bias is
to involve other physicians without any financial stakes in
either clinical case-management conferences or conjoint
patient management.
Although the vast majority of care decisions are made on
an individual physician-patient basis, the potential for
inappropriate self-referral may be moderated by employing
clinical case conferences. Such meetings may include inva-
sive and non-invasive cardiologists, primary care providers,
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independent cardiovascular surgeons, cardiac care associates,
and others, thus broadening the input into patient manage-
ment decisions.
Another approach for responsibility sharing involves
“partnerships in care,” wherein patients are cared for con-
jointly by their primary care provider and a cardiovascular
specialist. In this care model, it is implicit that the cardiol-
ogist will perform specialized diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures, with input from the referring and consulting
physician, as well as from the informed patient.
Physicians are often viewed by their patients as having
ultimate authority in health care decisions. Therefore, phy-
sicians must present the patient with a comprehensive
discussion of treatment alternatives, including the option to
do nothing, along with the relative risks and benefits of each
alternative course. Whenever doubt exists on the part of the
patient or the physician, there should be the opportunity to
seek additional opinions. For example, patients proposed for
multivessel angioplasty should generally be told of surgery as
an alternative and have the opportunity to consult a cardio-
vascular surgeon. For those patients who cannot or will not
participate in a discussion of care alternatives, it may be
appropriate to involve other family members, friends, spir-
itual advisors, and patient advocates in decision making. In
summary:
● The ACC/AHA guidelines are available for most car-
diovascular conditions and for diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures, and are readily accessible to physicians and
patients on the ACC and the AHA web sites.
● Physician compliance with ACC/AHA guidelines for
management of patients with cardiovascular disease
represents appropriate care in the majority of cases, and
such compliance should reduce concerns about self-
referral by cardiovascular practitioners.
● Procedural oversight by a professional laboratory director
and laboratory accreditation are both essential.
● Both procedural training and the credentialing of phy-
sicians, technicians, and other health care providers are
critical to good care.
● Involving other health care providers in medical care
decisions, such as cardiovascular surgeons and primary
care providers, limits bias.
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING AND SCREENING
Advertising of health-related services and products has
grown significantly in recent years. Direct-to-consumer
(DTC) advertising appears to be well entrenched and has
been legal for pharmaceuticals since the early 1970s. More
recently, advertising in the public media has grown rapidly
for medical devices, diagnostic testing (such as computed
tomography-based coronary artery calcium screening or
cholesterol screening), and for many non-cardiac or related
procedures. Sometimes performed in shopping malls or
church parking lots, these activities have raised a variety of
ethical concerns for the medical profession. At question is
the propriety of such DTC advertising, physician ownership
or investment in such enterprises, concern about patient
referral by a physician to a facility in which he or she is an
owner or investor, and the value of such screening in
promoting the public health.
Physician advertising is now recognized as legal under the
provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Regulations were clarified extensively by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997, including such lan-
guage as the requirement for “adequate provision: side
effects, contraindications, and effectiveness—this should
include either reference to a toll-free phone number, a
referral to a physician or pharmacist, a referral to a print
advertisement containing a summary of risk, and a web site.”
No such guidelines exist for device manufacturers for
diagnostic testing; in fact, the FDA has opposed some of
the diagnostic screening and testing advertisements (22,23).
Both the AMA and the American College of Physicians
have reviewed these issues and published similar guidelines
(4,5). These guidelines state that such advertisements “shall
not be misleading because of the omission of necessary
material information, shall not contain any false or mislead-
ing statement, or shall not otherwise operate to deceive.”
The AMA states that advertisements should “communicate
the information contained therein to the public in a readily
comprehensible manner” (22,23). Further, “the key issue,
however, is whether advertising or publicity regardless of
format or content is true and not materially misleading.” It
thus seems clear that advertising per se is professionally
accepted and legal, and the issues are those of appropriate
content and disclosure.
Guidelines similar to those for DTC pharmaceutical
advertisements seem appropriate and in part have been
proposed by the AMA for DTC advertising of diagnostic
testing. Where cardiovascular testing is involved, profes-
sional societies such as the ACCF and the AHA should
assume a leadership role in defining these guidelines at the
policy level rather than at an individual patient level. In
summary:
● The DTC advertising for diagnostic tests is unregulated
and needs oversight by appropriate regulatory agencies.
● Professional societies should develop guidelines for such
advertising and for the appropriateness of such tests.
CARDIOVASCULAR SPECIALTY
HOSPITALS AND SELF-REFERRAL
The role and quality of specialty hospitals. Cardiovascu-
lar specialty hospitals are a recent phenomenon. Although
cardiovascular care has traditionally been a component of
full-service general hospitals, in recent years a small number
of free-standing cardiovascular specialty hospitals have been
created. Virtually all of these hospitals are for-profit and are
located in jurisdictions with minimal or absent governmen-
tal control over the creation of health care facilities.
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The cardiovascular specialty hospital vision is a facility
specifically tailored to provide optimal cardiovascular care.
Ideally, a dedicated heart hospital can operate without any
of the compromises that result from the design and resource
competition issues of a full-service hospital. Such facilities
typically offer complete inpatient and outpatient cardiovas-
cular diagnostic and therapeutic services, but often do not
provide many of the non-cardiovascular services that are
traditionally included in a full-service hospital. Several incen-
tives foster the creation and operation of heart hospitals:
1. The heart hospital architecture, equipment, and opera-
tional protocols can be optimized for cardiovascular
care. Thus, it has the potential to provide the best
working environment for cardiovascular health care
providers and an optimal clinical care environment for
patients.
2. Reimbursement rates for cardiovascular care under pro-
spective payment systems are generally favorable. This
gives the heart hospital reasonable reimbursement and a
greater potential to be profitable, when compared to the
full-service hospital, which provides many services for
which prospective payment is less favorable.
3. Full-service hospitals, unlike heart hospitals, may divert
revenue from cardiovascular care to support other ser-
vice lines that are less well reimbursed. This does not
happen in a heart hospital.
Conversely, there are potential concerns about the appro-
priateness and positioning of such institutions in the overall
health care system. For example:
1. Can such institutions provide optimal care to all cardio-
vascular patients?
2. Do such hospitals undermine the strength and integrity
of full-service hospitals?
3. Do physicians who invest in these for-profit hospitals
have a conflict of interest when deciding where to admit
a particular patient?
The U.S. General Accounting Office recently released a
study of specialty hospitals in the U.S. that was commis-
sioned by the U.S. Congress (24). It identified 15 currently
operating heart hospitals with approximately a dozen more
in various stages of planning and construction. Virtually all
were for-profit institutions and virtually all had significant
investment on the part of physicians who held privileges at
that hospital.
With respect to economics and regional competition, the
study found that, whereas the majority of heart hospitals
were relatively small institutions, generally with 60 or fewer
beds, they frequently had a major regional impact in that
they tended to deliver a large fraction of the cardiovascular
services in their service area. Thus, they had a potentially
large impact on the cardiovascular service lines of the
competitive full-service institutions in their region. The
specialty hospitals tended to have a somewhat more favor-
able payer mix (smaller fraction of Medicaid-reimbursed
patients) than the full-service hospitals. In addition, spe-
cialty hospitals tended to have a slightly lower case-severity
index than full-service hospitals. All of these trends work to
enhance such institutions’ financial performance relative to
full-service hospitals.
With respect to clinical quality, other published studies
indicate that heart hospitals achieve outcomes comparable
to those of full-service hospitals with a potentially reduced
length of stay (25).
Ethical issues related to specialty hospitals. PHYSICIAN
FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST. Most heart hospitals
are for-profit. Many are capitalized in part through physi-
cian investment. Thus, some physicians who have privileges
at a heart hospital have a financial stake in the institution. It
has been pointed out that, in most cases, physicians provide
less than 50% of the start-up capital and, in general,
individual physicians have small ownership shares (26).
Thus, it can be argued that an individual physician’s
financial stake in an institution is modest, and a physician’s
income is not significantly influenced by the heart hospital’s
financial performance. However, the physician’s capital is at
risk, and should the hospital fail financially, he or she would
stand to lose the capital investment. Thus, such a conflict
might cause a physician to admit less complicated, better
insured patients to the heart hospital while diverting the
more complex, less well insured patients to the full-service
hospital.
IMPACT ON COMPETING FULL-SERVICE HOSPITALS. The
full-service hospital is often a vital community resource, and
the quality of health care within the community may be
dependent upon its financial and clinical success. Heart
hospitals can have a competitive advantage over full-service
hospitals for several reasons, including more favorable payer
mix and the ability to avoid caring for the more complicated
cases under the rationale that such patients require services
that might be offered only at full-service hospitals. Thus,
there is the potential for heart hospitals to “skim the cream”
of the cardiovascular service line. At this time, sufficient
published studies are not available to evaluate this concern
properly. In summary:
● Heart hospitals present an alternative to traditional
full-service hospitals for the delivery of straightforward
cardiovascular care.
● Heart hospitals have several characteristics that may be
appealing to individual cardiologists and their patients.
● Heart hospitals may present a possible conflict of interest
for involved physicians.
● Heart hospitals have the potential to affect a communi-
ty’s overall health care delivery system.
The ACC Board of Trustees has not taken a position for
or against such hospitals, but has endorsed the following
statement: “Given the wide range of opinions expressed by
ACC members and the ACC Board of Trustees, the ACC
recommends monitoring the data being collected during the
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18-month congressionally mandated moratorium on spe-
cialty hospitals. There remains significant, unanswered
questions about the financial impact on general, acute-care
hospitals, patient severity of illness at referral, and quality of
care in specialty hospitals. The primary concern of the ACC
is delivery of high-quality cardiovascular care to all Ameri-
cans; sufficient data do not now exist to judge whether
specialty heart hospitals are a useful innovation or are
detrimental to this mission. The ACC urges use of stan-
dardized databases such as NCDR and the Society for
Thoracic Surgery in an objective analysis of the performance
of specialty hospitals” (ACC Board of Trustees Minutes,
December 18, 2003). Likewise, the AHA’s primary mission
is the reduction of disability and death from cardiovascular
disease and stroke, and in the absence of adequate data, the
AHA has not taken a position on heart hospitals. The AHA
agrees that the data from the 18-month mandated morato-
rium must be studied carefully before conclusions can be
reached.
LEGAL ISSUES IN SELF-REFERRAL
The anti-kickback statute. Fraud and abuse laws provide
criminal penalties to those who knowingly and willfully
offer, pay, solicit, or receive remuneration in exchange for
referrals of patients or business reimbursed by a federal
health care program (27,28). The law was aimed to prevent
outright payments for referrals by clinical laboratories, home
health agencies, durable medical equipment vendors, and
other suppliers. These policies were enacted to:
1. prevent referrals based on financial benefit to the health
care provider making the referral, rather than the
greatest benefit for the beneficiary;
2. prohibit solicitation of such payments;
3. prevent overutilization of services; and
4. control governmental cost of providing health care
coverage.
Violation of the statute is a felony punishable by fines of
up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.
Individuals found guilty might be excluded from participa-
tion in federal and state health care programs.
Congress also directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to develop regulations that would specifi-
cally exclude certain arrangements from being considered
anti-kickback violations. The safe-harbor exceptions recog-
nize that there are legitimate reasons for a health care entity
to pay a physician—as, for example, a hospital medical
director—or for clinical laboratory oversight. Potentially
illegal hospital-physician incentives have also been defined
and can include the use of discounted office space or
equipment in facilities usually located near the hospital.
Such arrangements are considered inurements designed to
influence physicians’ utilization decisions. Fair-market lease
agreements are advised to avoid such liabilities. The Office
of the Inspector General accepts requests for formal advi-
sory opinions although these may not be relied upon by
third parties as legal precedent (28).
The Stark laws. The Stark Law seeks to prohibit referrals
by physicians of Medicare or Medicaid patients to facilities
in which the physician has an ownership interest or from
which the physician receives compensation (28,29). Com-
pensation can be any form of remuneration, direct or
indirect, between the physician or family member and the
designated health service provider. These include clinical
laboratory services, radiology diagnostic services, inpatient
and outpatient hospital services, and durable medical equip-
ment covered in the Medicare fee schedule. The Stark
legislation is based on the presumption that physicians will
overutilize such services if they profit from the referrals or
the orders. “Stark” is distinct from the anti-kickback statute.
First, Stark evaluates exclusively the financial incentives of
the provider making the referral and not the intent of the
parties. Second, Stark is a civil, rather than criminal, statute.
Violators are not subject to criminal prosecution but may be
excluded from federal health care programs and face civil
monetary fines.
Much confusion has resulted from the passage of two
Stark bills, from the complexity of the laws, and from the
slow issuance of rational implementing regulations. Al-
though the basic prohibition for a referral was clearly
defined, Stark II provides exceptions to the general prohi-
bition on referrals (29). The most common exception is the
in-office ancillary services exception, when the service is
performed within a group practice. In summary:
● The Stark law and the anti-kickback legislation are
extremely complex and confusing. It has taken 10 years
for the government to publish only a portion of the final
regulations.
● Safe-harbors are difficult to interpret without legal
counsel.
● Although these laws have prevented some of the most
ethically egregious examples of kickbacks and fee split-
ting, they have not limited the significant growth in
cardiovascular activities that are in part due to self-
referral within the solo or group practice setting.
OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY
Both the ACCF and the AHA take seriously the respon-
sibility of their members to optimize care for their patients.
This can best be done by effective application of evidence-
based medicine and practicing the highest standards of
medical care. The issue of “self-referral” and its possible
incentive for inappropriate utilization is an important con-
sideration in medical practice. In this document, we have
discussed the pertinent background of this issue and made
positive recommendations to address this concern. Most
self-referral is entirely appropriate. This “self-referral” is
open and obvious to all parties. The management of
self-referral also includes procedural laboratory oversight
and accreditation and physician competence in a given
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procedure. Physician ownership of equipment outside of the
physician’s practice setting is a complex professional issue
and should conform to AMA guidelines, which promi-
nently include full disclosure and transparency.
The commercialization of screening tests and advertise-
ments for these tests are largely unregulated. This field
needs both regulatory oversight and guidance from profes-
sional organizations such as the ACCF, the AHA, and
cardiovascular specialty societies.
Cardiovascular specialty hospitals have raised issues about
potential conflicts of interest among physician investors and
their possible impact on community hospitals. The ACCF
and the AHA have not taken a specific position on this
issue, but members of this Consensus Conference currently
support the collection of more data about the quality of care
and outcomes provided by such hospitals.
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